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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION
Leslie Moses*
OUISIANA stands as one of the foremost producers of oil and
gas in the nation. It has gas reserves reaching an approxi-
mate figure of seventeen trillion feet,1 and the annual revenue
from its severance tax is in excess of $13,000,000. Its economy
today is dependent upon the oil and gas industry for more than
half its total revenue. With one industry, based upon the develop.
ment of the State's greatest natural resource, so vastly important
to the welfare of the people, the conservation program must nec-
essarily be sound.
Louisiana, in its wisdom and foresight, has long recognized the
necessity of protecting and conserving such a natural resource,
and it is believed that the structure of its program of conserva-
tion is the best in the United States. The present Department of
Conservation was established and created under the provisions
of the 1921 Constitution,' which elsewhere provided that the Gov-
ernor should appoint a Commissioner of Conservation with the
advice and consent of the Senate.3 The courts have held, accord-
ingly, that the Commissioner of Conservation is a constitutional
officer of the State of Louisiana.4 Its conservation statute' is looked
upon as one of the two best in the United States, the other being
the Arkansas statute.6
*Member of the Shreveport, Louisiana, Bar and Division Attorney, Midstates Oil
Corporation. Author of numerous articles on mineral law in the Texas Law Review,
Tulane Law Review, Mississippi Law Journal and oil trade magazines.
1 In an address before the Mineral Law Section of the American Bar Association
former Governor Sam H. Jones said in recent estimates reserves ranged from 11 to
19 trillion cubic feet. See Proceedings, Mineral Law Section, A.B.A. (December, 1946)
60.
2 LA. CONST. (1921) Art. VI, § 1; 30 LA. REV. STAT. (1950) § 1.
3 LA. CONST. (1921) Art. V, § 18.
4 State v. Maestri, 199 La. 49, 5 So. 2d 499 (1941).
5 La Acts 1940, No. 157; 30 LA. REv. STAT. (1950) § 1 et seq.
6 Ark. Acts 1939, No. 105, as amended by Acts 1941, No. 305.
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Louisiana's statute contains the policy of the State relative to
conservation, and a study of its salient features will reveal that
instead of being unwieldy and unworkable, it is most efficient
and facile. Needless to say, the genius of the statute is that it is
based upon the experience of Louisiana's sister states, and recog-
nizes that the factors of conservation must be conscientiously dealt
with by the regulatory body and administered without fear, favor
or influence. It is the outgrowth of legislative experience, judicial
interpretations and constitutional approvals dating back almost
fifty years. It is not generally realized, perhaps, but Louisiana has
been one of the pioneers in the enactment of conservation laws.
In no other field is the evolution of knowledge concerning the
physical facts of oil and gas production so clearly traceable on
the statute books as in Louisiana.
Soon after the discovery of the Caddo Field a disastrous blow-
out and fire occurred in a well called "The Ananias Hunting &
Fishing Club No. 1."' The legislature in 1906 passed a law mak-
ing it a criminal offense to "negligently permit" a gas well to "go
wild" or "wastefully burn,"8 which marked the beginning of legis-
lative control of the industry in the state.
There have been many pieces of legislation since then directed
toward the conservation of oil and gas. Originally a Commission
of Natural Resources was formed;9 then a Department of Mining
and Minerals;' then a Department of Conservation which vested
in the Commissioner the protection of all the natural resources of
the State.11 In addition there were numerous other statutes dealing
with various phases of oil field practice and procedure. 2 Each
one gave recognition to some additional aspect of the importance
7 MINERAL LAW SECTION, A.B.A., LEGAL HISTORY or CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS
(1938) 61.
8 La. Acts 1906, No. 61.
9 Acts 1908, No. 144.
10 Acts 1910, No. 254.
"1 Acts 1912, No. 127.
12 Acts 1912, No. 91; Acts 1918, Nos. 168; 268 and 270; see Moses, Statutory Regu-
lations in the Carbon Black Industry, 20 Tulane L. Rev. 83 (1945).
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of the industry to the state and the value to public as well as pri-
vate interests in seeing that the resources were utilized to the best
advantage.
The first general statutes were enacted in 1924, one covering
gas,'" the other oil.14 These two statutes marked a vital step for-
ward in petroleum conservation. For the first time in any state
there was recognized the principle of ownership in a common
source of supply co-extensive with the individual ownership in the
land overlying the reservoir.
The first combined statute 5 was modeled after New Mexico's
law, 6 which at that time was considered the most advanced ever
drafted, and which is still in existence. Its limitations were recog-
nized: it did not adequately define waste; it based proration on
market demand alone; the spacing and pooling provisions did not
always prevent unnecessary drilling; it did not provide for re-
cycling and pressure maintenance; the penal provisions were of
no great value; and the general procedural articles were inade-
quate.
In 1940 the Louisiana Legislature recognized that piecemeal
amendment did not solve the problem and that a complete revision
of all legislation by means of a new statute was desirable. Act
No. 157 of 1940 was formulated and passed. It embraced the
best features of the New Mexico law, the then recently adopted
Arkansas law,' 7 and recommendations of the Interstate Oil Com-
pact Commission. As a result, a large part of it now appears in
the model conservation act form recommended for use by the
Interstate Oil Compact Commission."
The new act differed in four major aspects from the 1936
statute, as follows:
13 Acts 1924, No. 252.
14 Acts 1924, No. 253.
.15 Acts 1936, No. 226.
16 N. M. Laws 1935, c. 72.
17 Supra note 6.
18 See Interstate Oil Compact Commission, A Form for an Oil and Gas Conservation
Statute (1949).
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(1) The old act placed its major emphasis on the limitation
of production to "reasonable market demand," whereas in the
new statute the limitation was predicated squarely upon the pre-
vention of waste.
(2) In order to prevent one property owner from being placed
in a less advantageous position than another by reason of the im-
position of any regulation, the new statute provided that at the
time such action was taken, other action would be taken as would
protect the correlative rights of all co-owners of the property sub-
ject to regulation.
(3) The new statute recognized that the drilling of unnecessary
wells constituted waste, and so proper spacing regulations could
be made to eliminate unnecessary drilling. Under the 1936 act
spacing could be established, but if a lease owner desired to drill
on a smaller tract he could do so, subject only to the penalty of
a reduction in allowable.
(4) The new statute recognized the different problems pre-
sented in the development of gas-condensate fields and the need
for pressure maintenance and recycling, and granted the Com-
missioner the authority to enter necessary rules and orders to
make possible modern programs of recycling and pressure mainte-
nance.
One of the foremost questions of concern was delegating power
to a regulatory body. The authority granted is rather specific and
detailed. During the formative period of the statute there was dis-
cussion as to whether it should contain simple prohibitions against
waste, assuming that the necessary authority to enforce would
follow, or whether it should contain specifically the means by
which the regulatory body could control waste. The latter view
prevailed. Whether such specific authority is necessary as a matter
of law is not known; however, it is unquestionably the fact that
much litigation has been obviated as a result of its inclusion.
A great danger in drafting legislation with particularity lies.
in the fact that engineering principles change from time to time..
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It was necessary, therefore, to make the law flexible enough to
permit enforcement under new discoveries, advanced methods and
more up-to-date engineering data. The statute has been so drawn
that it not only sets forth with particularity the authority of the
Commissioner but also is flexible enough to permit the use of the
most advanced engineering and geological information.
A concise examination of the essentials of this act reveals that
first of all it prohibits waste: 9 both of oil and gas, with a com-
plete definition of waste." The definition, together with the de-
tailed regulations that follow, constitutes the heart and soul of
this sound conservation law. The statute is comprehensive and
permits the Commissioner to relate those efforts and regulations,
which include proration, limited withdrawals, spacing and operat-
ing practices, and pooling and unitization, to the physical condi-
tions which have to do with the kind of waste defined.
There follow definitions of other terms used, and the Commis-
sioner is granted certain broad powers,2 among them being the
enforcement of drilling and spacing regulations, the proration of
production, securing copies of logs, surveys and drilling reports,
installing meters, and many others necessary and incidental to
proper drilling practice and procedure and sound conservation.
Another section provides that whether the production from a
pool be limited or prorated, no rule, regulation or order of the
Commissioner shall have the effect of forcing a producer, in order
to obtain his just and equitable share of the production, to drill
a well in addition to that which will produce his share without
waste, or to occasion drainage from a tract unless additional wells
be drilled. The same section authorizes the establishment of
drilling units and defines a drilling unit as the "maximum area
which may be efficiently and economically drained by one well."24
19 La. Acts 1940, No. 157, § 1; 30 LA. Rzv. STAT. (1950) § 2.
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A necessary weapon in the enforcement of drilling patterns is
the power of forced integration. Spacing rules and the authority
of regulatory bodies to adopt such have, in a large measure, revo-
lutionized the petroleum industry. As an adjunct to the right to
fix drilling units, the Louisiana statute has given the Commis-
sioner the authority to pool lands as a drilling or producing unit."
If those owners within a drilling unit refuse to participate, they
may be forced to do so after due notice and hearing. The con-
stitutionality of this section has been upheld by the Louisiana
Supreme Court;26 so there are no problems now involved in such
enforced unitization.
There is a great difference between the unitization of a drilling
unit and the unitization of a field or pool. It is comparatively easy
to administer the provisions of the statute once the drilling unit
has been established by the Commissioner, but it is quite another
thing to unitize an entire area. It is believed that the Louisiana
statute is the first, and possible the only one, that attempts to make
any provision for such type unitization. This effort is couched in
the following language:
"In order to prevent waste, and to avoid the drilling of unnecessary
wells, the Commissioner shall, after notice and upon hearing, determine
the feasibility of and require the re-cycling of gas in any pool or portion
of a pool productive of gas from which condensate or distillate may be
separated or natural gasoline extracted, and promulgate rules to unitize
separate ownerships and to regulate production of the gas and re-intro-
duction of the gas into productive formations after separation of con.
densate or distillate, or extraction of natural gasoline from such gas.''27
The problem of distribution of production and allocation to
fields was not overlooked, even though experts in the field of con-
servation are in disagreement as to whether proration should be
26 § 9.
26 Hunter Company v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d 495, a/I'd, 320 U. S. 222
(1942) ; Hood v. Southern Production Company, 206 La. 642, 19 So. 2d 336 (1944).
27 § 4(b).
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by field or by wells alone. Louisiana adopted the view that it
should be by fields,2" but it must be on a reasonable basis and on
such a basis that wells of settled production will not be abandoned
prematurely. 29 As a consequence, stripper wells have been given
an allowable of all they are capable of producing, and flush wells
are limited to factors of market demand and maximum efficient
recovery. The testing of the rule of allocation between fields has
never come up in Louisiana outside of the regulatory body itself.
It is speculative as to what exactly the rule is, but it is believed
that the courts would be most reluctant to interfere with the find-
ings of the Commissioner.
Since the teeth of any statute are its penal clauses, Louisiana's
Commissioner is authorized to go to the courts whenever there is
a violation or a threat of violation of the statute or any order
issued.8 ° If he does not, any person affected can file suit. "Hot"
oil is prohibited, and the condemnation of any product produced
in violation of the statute is authorized8 ' and its ultimate disposi-
tion set out in detail."2
In this discussion we are concerned primarily with the admin-
istrative procedure before the Commissioner of Conservation and
his staff. It should be borne in mind that the most important fea-
ture with respect to the powers granted the Commissioner is that
no regulation or order can be issued, especially those requiring
the exercise of judgment, without a hearing called after due notice
to all parties in interest, giving them an opportunity to appear and
express themselves.33 It should be noted that the rules or order of
procedure in hearings are those of the Commissioner, who has
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Acting by virtue of such authority, the Commissioner has issued
a set of Rules of Procedure for Public Hearings."5
No regulation, order, exception or rule can be issued except
after a public hearing called for that particular purpose, after ten
days' notice in the manner and form prescribed both by the
statute"6 and the Rules of Procedure. The notice required to be
given must be published in the official journal of the State of
Louisiana, and usually in the official journal of the parish in
which the land affected by the hearing lies. In addition to such
official notice by publication, copies of the notice are sent to all
parties in interest of whom the Department has knowledge. In this
connection it is customary for the applicant to annex to his peti-
tion for a hearing a list of such interested parties known to him.
If such a list is not annexed, he is usually requested to furnish
the Department with it. One should not overlook the importance
of the requirement of proper notice and hearing, for otherwise the
constitutional requirement of due process of law would be lacking
and any order issued would be void. In this connection it may be
added that the statute has recognized the fact that immediate ac-
tion is sometimes necessary. In the event of an emergency the
Commissioner is permitted to issue a rule, regulation or order
without a public hearing or notice, provided that the effectiveness
of the order can last but fifteen days, unless extended by a new
order, issued after due notice and a hearing.3"
Practice before the Commissioner and his staff at hearings is
most informal.39 There are no technical rules of procedure, nor
are court rules of evidence strictly adhered to. While the evidence
is transcribed by a reporter, the matter of proper evidence is of
little import. The primary purpose of the hearing is to obtain the
necessary facts concerning the subject of the hearing with as
85 La. Dept. of Conservation, Rules of Procedure for Public Hearings, adopted
March 25, 1948.
36§ 5(b).




little delay as possible, including technical impediments. The
Commissioner usually permits everything to go into the record,
leaving it to the courts, if a disputed matter ever goes that far, to
decide whether some of it was improperly admitted or not. Since
legal, engineering and geological problems in connection with the
development of oil and gas fields are inseparable, one often finds
engineers conducting hearings on behalf of interested parties,
cross-examining other engineers or geologists on highly technical
matters, or sitting beside the lawyer, constantly advising him. It
must be borne in mind that every interested party is given a right
to be heard whether or not he is represented by legal counsel or
technical advisors.
Despite the informality of the hearings, the Commissioner is
empowered to subpoena witnesses, call for the production of docu-
ments and request the district court to assist him in enforcing the
orders he may issue.40 In testifying before the Commissioner no
person can be subjected to criminal prosecution because of what
he may testify to;41 this provision satisfies the immunity clause
of the Constitution of Louisiana.42 Perjury, however, is punish-
able.4"
The public hearings heretofore mentioned are set in motion by
a request in writing by any party interested in the subject matter
of the hearing." Of course, the Department can, of its own initia-
tive, request a hearing. Within thirty days after the hearing the
Commissioner is required to take action thereon,45 and upon his
failure to do so, any interested party has the right to compel action
by him by the filing of a writ of mandamus in the court.46 Any
party aggrieved by the ruling of the Commissioner may resort to
the courts, but only after he has exhausted his administrative
40 7.
41 § 7(a).
42 LA. CONST. (1921) Art. 1, § 2.
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remedies.47 Court action is by way of injunction, and any suit
filed may be tried summarily on ten days' notice, thus preventing
someone from attempting to tie the hands of the Commissioner in
the enforcement of the statute. In the trial of the case the burden
of proof rests on the plaintiff, for there is a prima facie presump-
tion of the validity of the action taken by the Commissioner. 4' All
pertinent evidence is admissible, and one has the right to introduce
into evidence the entire proceedings and findings of fact of the
Commissioner. The decision of the district court may be appealed
to a higher court.49
The Louisiana conservation statute, unlike Minerva of ancient
mythology, did not spring fully clothed from the mind of any one
person. It was the result of labor of informed thinking, of past
experience and of earnest effort on the part of lawyers, landmen,
geologists, engineers and practical oil operators. The courts have
been impressed by it, and have unhesitatingly indicated their ap-
proval of it. Although the statute has been before the courts in
but few instances, 50 the constitutionality of the entire statute, as
well as of certain specific provisions thereof, has been upheld.
Let it be fully understood that the fact that any state has a mod-
ern, practical and satisfactory conservation statute does not, per-
force, insure its own effectiveness. No system devised by man can
sustain itself without the integrity and diligence of those charged
with its administration. Louisiana has been blessed in recent years




50 Hunter Company v. McHugh, Hood v. Southern Production Company, both cited
slpra note 26; Hunter Company v. Shell Oil Company, 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10
(1947) ; Crichton v. Lee, 209 La. 561, 25 So. 2d 229 (1946) ; Alston v. Southern Pro.
duction Company, 207 La. 370, 21 So. 2d 383 (1945) ; McHugh v. Placid Oil Company,
206 La. 511, 19 So. 2d 221 (1944) ; Placid Oil Company v. North Central Texas Oil
Co., 206 La. 293, 19 So. 2d 616 (1944) ; Ohio Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 28 So. 2d 504 (La.
App. 1946).
